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Highlights 
 Insider-owned firms pursue U.S. cross-listings following periods of extraordinary performance. 
 The long-run post-cross-listing abnormal returns turn negative for insider-controlled firms.  
 The Sarbanes–Oxley Act has mitigated the attempts to time the cross-listing market.  
 The returns of capital-raising firms are more sensitive to potential agency problems. 
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Abstract 
Insider-owned firms pursue U.S. cross-listings following periods of extraordinary performance. 
However, the long-run post-cross-listing abnormal returns become negative only for insider-
controlled cross-listings. We find that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) has mitigated the market-
timing attempts as negative abnormal returns are limited to the pre-SOX period, supporting a cross-
listing bonding benefit after U.S. securities regulation was enhanced. In addition, investors 
anticipate future operating performance as stock returns incorporate forthcoming operating 
outcomes one and two years ahead. Whereas capital-raising cross-listings show better operating 
performance than non-capital-raising, the returns of capital-raising firms are more sensitive to the 
potential agency problems created by insider-ownership. 
 
JEL Codes: G30, G32, G34 
 
Keywords: Cross-listings, emerging markets, market timing, insider ownership, firm performance, 
agency problems, Sarbanes-Oxley. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last two decades, firms from emerging markets have experienced a substantial 
reduction on restrictions to capital flows and therefore have enjoyed access to more mature capital 
markets. Cross-listing abroad represents the most common way to enter foreign equity markets. In 
particular, U.S. exchanges have been popular destinations among emerging-market firms looking 
to cross-list shares overseas.1 When firms pursue a U.S. dual-listing, they deposit a fraction of their 
shares in an investment bank located in the host country, which subsequently issues American 
Depository Receipts (ADR) in exchange for these shares.2 Existing literature suggests that firms 
cross-listing in the U.S. benefit as market integration, liquidity, investor recognition, shareholder 
base, information environment, and shareholder protection improve. 3  However, whether 
shareholders have a long-term benefit following cross-listing events is still inconclusive. 
There is consensus among academics that after firms cross-list in the U.S., there are short-
term positive abnormal returns. This finding appears intuitive as the expected reduction in the cost 
of capital has a one-time short-term adjustment to market valuation, but potentially leads to lower 
long-run expected returns. Formerly negative net present value projects become wealth-increasing 
investment opportunities as the discount rate declines in the new phase of the cross-listed firm. 
Similarly, the perceived shift in transparency and shareholder protection impact firm valuation 
through the expected cash flows (numerator) component of the valuation equation. There is a strong 
                                                          
1 Exchange-listed sponsored ADRs increased from 79 (three from emerging countries) by December, 1990 to 366 
(215 from emerging countries) by December, 2010. The sources are the depository receipts websites: 
http://www.adrbnymellon.com, http://www.citiadr.idmanagedsolutions.com/ and https://www.adr.com. 
2 There are four types of ADRs. Level 1 trade only over-the-counter (OTC). Level 2 and Level 3 are U.S. exchange-
listed; however, the latter is allowed to raise new capital. Level 4 or Rule 144-A are ADR private offerings exclusive 
to qualified institutional buyers. Throughout the paper we refer to levels 2 and 3 as exchange-traded cross-listings. 
3 Karolyi (2006) and King and Segal (2009), among others, identify comparable benefits as the main reasons why 
firms cross-list in the U.S. 
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intuition behind the commonly established short-term gains that follow cross-listings. Yet, to what 
extent investors have benefitted from long-term holding of equity of cross-listed firms remains 
unclear. This paper examines the long-term operating and stock performance of emerging-market 
firms after they cross-list in the U.S.  
We contribute to the existing literature by analyzing the implications of ownership 
structure, a proxy for potential agency problems, on the post-cross-listing performance. Ownership 
structure is of particular relevance in emerging markets as it affects corporate governance and 
determines the degree of potential issues between principal and agents (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 
2013). Specifically, when firms are insider-controlled, the potential for agency problems is higher 
than in non-insider-controlled firms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Li, Morck, 
Yang, and Yeung, 2004). This is particularly important in the context of real or perceived 
deficiencies in legal protection afforded to investors in developing countries. The effect of 
ownership structure on firm performance has received some attention in previous literature; 
however, its effects on the long-term operating performance and stock returns of cross-listed firms 
have not been previously documented. This issue is relevant as firms that cross-list in the U.S. 
have considerable influence on their home countries’ economy and on the world’s financial 
markets. We provide strong arguments in support of policies aimed at increasing the accountability 
of foreign corporate executives with the intention of protecting U.S. stock-market participants. In 
addition, it is important for academics and practitioners to identify whether firms benefit from 
cross-listing on U.S. stock exchanges and whether firm-level shareholder protection exerts any 
influence on the outcome.  
There is a gap in the cross-listing literature as previous research does not employ firm-level 
measures of corporate governance to assess the operating performance and stock returns around 
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cross-listing events. The increase in shareholder protection implied by the bonding hypothesis has 
received considerable attention in recent years. Using cross-listing events, we test the bonding 
hypothesis (performance improves) versus the “avoiding” or market timing hypothesis 
(performance deteriorates) put forward by Licht (2003), controlling for the degree of potential for 
agency conflicts. Lastly, we test whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) has affected the 
performance of cross-listed firms given that exchange-traded ADRs are subject to this law.4 Our 
manuscript contributes to the existing literature as, to the best of our knowledge, there is no prior 
empirical evidence on the effects of firm-level investor protection on the long-term operating 
performance and stock returns of emerging-market cross-listed firms. 
Our findings lend support for the market timing hypothesis prior to the enactment of the 
SOX. Insider-owned firms cross-list following periods of extraordinary positive performance as 
they outperform a benchmark only in the pre-cross-listing years. In addition, the long-run abnormal 
returns in the post-cross-listing period are negative only for firms controlled by insiders. However, 
SOX has mitigated the attempts to time the cross-listing market as negative abnormal returns 
appear only during the pre-SOX period, questioning the soundness of the bonding hypothesis prior 
to this piece of legislation. Moreover, consistent with the equity offerings literature, the stock 
returns of capital-raising cross-listings are more sensitive to the risk of being expropriated by 
insiders.  
 
 
                                                          
4 The U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in July 2002, following a number of high-profile corporate 
scandals during 2001. This Act aims to prevent managerial and accounting misconduct by imposing additional 
disclosure requirements and corporate governance mandates.    
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2. Related literature and hypotheses 
2.1 Background on cross-listings 
Firms cross-listing in the U.S. reduce their cost of capital as market integration and risk 
sharing improves (Stapleton and Subrahmanyam, 1977; Errunza and Losq, 1985; Alexander, Eun, 
and Janakiramanan, 1988). In addition, cross-listed firms improve their liquidity (Karolyi, 1998; 
Foerster and Karolyi, 2000), investor recognition and shareholder base (Foerster and Karolyi, 
1999), information transparency (Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2003; Karolyi, 2006; Fernandes and 
Ferreira, 2008), and shareholder protection (Stulz, 1999; Coffee, 1999, 2002; Doidge, Karolyi, and 
Stulz, 2004). 5  However, these cross-listing improvements have not consistently reflected 
positively on subsequent long-term firm performance. A bonding benefit for cross-listed firms has 
been the focus of recent developments in international asset pricing.6 Karolyi (2012) surveys the 
cross-listing literature and notes that whereas the bonding hypothesis has been questioned, the 
evidence is still far from conclusive.  
Existing literature supports the idea that cross-listed firms obtain a short-term positive 
abnormal return (Jayaraman, Shastri, and Tandon, 1993; Miller, 1999; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; 
Benos and Weisbach, 2004). However, the influence on long-term stock returns is less than clear. 
Foerster and Karolyi (2000) find that the three-year buy-and-hold returns of cross-listed firms 
underperform the benchmark; however, firms with high trading volume have positive abnormal 
returns. Mittoo (2003) finds that Canadian firms list in the U.S. after strong market performance. 
                                                          
5 See Karolyi (2006, 2012) for a comprehensive description of the cross-listing hypotheses. 
 
6 Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, & Stulz (2009) posit that, despite the benefit for minority shareholders, some insider-
controlled firms may choose not to cross-list if staying out of the reach of U.S. regulation is more beneficial to insiders, 
thereby supporting the bonding hypothesis. 
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Cross-listings underperform a benchmark by 13% to 30% during a three-year post-cross-listing 
period. Charitou and Louca (2009) find no abnormal returns one year after the cross-listing event. 
Similarly, Sarkissian and Schill (2009) find no long-term effect on the returns of firms that list 
abroad. The latter results are robust to the country characteristic, yet they do not include controls 
for firm-level variables. Lastly, Luo, Fang, and Esqueda (2012) show that Chinese firms listed on 
U.S. exchanges underperform a matching firm during the three post cross-listing years.  
The evidence on the operating performance of cross-listings is scant. Mittoo (2003) finds 
that operating performance deteriorates during the three post-cross-listing years for Canadian 
firms. However, Charitou and Louca (2009) find that the operating performance of capital-raising 
and non-capital-raising firms is at least as good as their benchmark firms in the pre-cross-listing 
year and both groups outperform the benchmark during the three years after cross-listing. Yet, 
previous findings on capital-raising and post-listing events consistently provide support for the 
window dressing and market timing hypotheses. For instance, Jain and Kini (1994) and Loughram 
and Ritter (1997) find that operating performance declines after firms issue new stock. Dharan and 
Ikenberry (1995) also show a post-listing decline in firm performance. Additionally, Loughram 
and Ritter (1995) uncover negative abnormal returns following initial public offerings (IPO) in the 
U.S. Moreover, in international equity markets, the managerial opportunism is not expected to be 
less of an issue. The potential for agency problems is exacerbated in emerging-market firms as less 
transparent and less clear management structures worsens corporate governance practices 
(Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013).  
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2.2 Hypotheses  
One is tempted to believe that managers from foreign firms choose to time the market and 
cross-list before a decline in performance, which may explain why the gains of cross-listings are 
limited to short periods. Supporting the market timing hypothesis, Siegel (2005) provides a 
framework where foreign firms can act opportunistically despite being subject to regulation by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as there is still a relatively low level of securities law 
enforcement toward foreign firms. The author suggests that cross-listings can only provide a 
“reputational” bonding rather than a “legal” bonding. Specifically, the legal bonding hypothesis 
predicts that operating performance improves as insiders can no longer easily expropriate wealth 
from minority shareholders. The legal bonding hypothesis is questioned by Licht’s (2003) 
argument that cross-listed firms are insensitive to crucial features of U.S. securities regulation 
regime since corporate insiders from foreign issuers are subject to less restrictive provisions of the 
SEC regulation.7  
Whether foreign firms can take advantage of a period of extraordinary performance to 
cross-list in the U.S is still being debated. Scholars have provided compelling arguments for the 
bonding hypothesis as well as for the market timing hypothesis. Given this background, we explore 
the following research questions: Do firms underperform the benchmark portfolio following cross-
listing or do they improve their performance as expected by the bonding hypothesis? Are the pre-
cross-listing abnormal returns and operating performance an indication of market timing? 
                                                          
7 For instance, the Wall Street Journal reports on March 21st 2014 (“Easier Rules Lure Foreign Firms to List in U.S.”) 
that less restrictive corporate governance standard make U.S. exchanges more attractive for foreign firms than 
competing stock exchanges in the U.K. and Hong Kong. For example, firms registered on U.S. exchanges can adopt 
dual-class share structures, whereas this is forbidden in the U.K and Hong Kong.  
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Insider ownership has been determined to exacerbate the principal–agent issue in foreign 
firms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Licht, 2003; Lins, 2003; Guedhami and 
Mishra, 2009) and its influence is more pronounced in countries with relatively poor legal 
protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 2000; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). In addition, King and Segal (2009) and 
Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) indicate that dual-class share structures facilitates the expropriation 
of minority shareholders through tunneling and other moral hazard activities. Improvements in 
firm-level corporate governance are particularly beneficial for minority shareholders, therefore, 
firms with weak shareholder protection must benefit the most from cross-listing, according to the 
bonding hypothesis. However, controlling insiders of emerging-market firms have more freedom 
to overstate financial prospects or manage earnings. Correspondingly, insider-owned firms are 
able to make timely decisions of when to cross-list; hence, similar to Esqueda (2015), we employ 
insider-ownership as our main proxy for agency conflicts. We test whether firms with higher 
propensity for agency conflicts perform differently than firms where minority shareholders are 
believed to be better protected. In this context, we expect insider-owned cross-listings to 
underperform their non-insider-controlled counterpart. 
We also examine the effect of the enhanced disclosure requirements and corporate 
governance mandates comprised in the SOX, on the performance of cross-listed firms. In the 
market for newly issued U.S. stocks, Johnston and Madura (2009) find that the SOX reduced 
uncertainty in IPO valuation and has improved their aftermarket performance, thereby reducing 
the uncertainty on new equity issues. Esqueda, Luo, and Jackson (2015) find a significant effect 
of SOX on foreign firms trading in the U.S. as there is a structural break on the returns of Latin 
American ADRs before and after the SOX. Correspondingly, Berger, Li, and Wong (2005) 
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conclude that cross-listings from countries with weak private enforcement of investor rights have 
the highest short-term gains from the enhanced regulation provided by SOX, suggesting a bonding 
benefit of cross-listing. We investigate whether this act has influenced the bonding benefit on U.S. 
cross-listings by segmenting our sample into before and after the enactment of SOX.  
 
3. Data  
Karolyi (2006) indicates that the benefit from increased market integration is contingent 
on the pre-cross-listing capital barriers and is therefore an evolution of the market segmentation 
hypothesis. We use domestic stock market development to control for the maturity of their capital 
markets and the country-level access to capital markets, similar to Ayyagari and Doidge (2010).8 
In addition, we employ legal origin and anti-directors rights from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) to measure investor protection in the home country.9 At the firm-level, 
corporate governance is associated with ownership structure (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). 
When firms are insider-controlled, the potential for agency problems is higher than in non-insider-
controlled firms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Li, Morck, Yang, and Yeung, 
2004). Lins (2003), Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004), and Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and 
Stulz (2009) establish that insider-controlling shareholders can expropriate wealth from minority 
shareholders. In addition, Lins (2003) finds that investors discount value from firms that are 
insider-controlled. Moreover, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) note that the extent 
and frequency of diffused ownership varies according to the degree of economic development. For 
                                                          
8 Stock market development is defined as the aggregate market value of listed shares in the cross-listing home country 
deflated by the corresponding GDP (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2000).  
9  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) define country legal origin classification as follows: 
“Common law countries have the strongest protection of outside investors – both shareholders and creditors – whereas 
French civil law countries have the weakest protection. German civil law and Scandinavian countries fall in between.”  
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instance, outside the U.S. and other mature markets, publicly-traded firms tend to be controlled by 
large shareholders. In general, firms from emerging markets share comparable ownership 
structures. We follow Lins (2003), King and Segal (2009), and Esqueda (2015) and control for 
ownership structure using dummy variables to identify the existence of controlling shareholders 
and whether they are insiders.  
When firms operate under a dual-class share structure, cash flow rights differ from voting 
rights, placing holders of low-voting shares at a disadvantage (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). 
Hence, similar to King and Segal (2009), we include a dummy variable for dual-class share 
structure. To proxy for visibility, we control for the median number of analysts following a firm 
during the months of July and November as did Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003). Analyst coverage 
is obtained from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Additionally, the turnover 
of the cross-listed shares traded on U.S. exchanges is employed as a measure of liquidity.10  
We form a comprehensive list of ADRs from emerging markets from the Bank of New 
York, Chase Bank, and Citigroup depository receipts websites. In order to be included in the 
sample, cross-listed firms must be sponsored DR programs and have data available in Datastream 
Thomson Reuters (Datastream hereafter).11 Financial and utilities firms are excluded from the 
sample as these industries are highly regulated in most countries. Our data corresponds to the five 
years before the cross-listing event, or the earliest the data is available, and up to 10 years after the 
firm is cross-listed using information for the years 1990 to 2010.12 If a firm delists during the 
                                                          
10 Turnover equals volume divided by shares outstanding. Mittoo (2003) finds similar results using turnover and the 
bid-ask spread as proxies for liquidity. 
11 The sample includes only exchange-traded ADRs (level 2 and level 3) since OTC and Rule 144-A firms are not 
required to report annually to the SEC and data for these firms is unavailable in I/B/E/S and Datastream. Charitou and 
Louca (2009) and King and Segal (2009) follow a similar approach. 
12 Datastream has limited financial data from emerging countries before 1990 (Li, Morck, Yang, and Yeung, 2004) 
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sample period, the data is truncated subsequent to the delisting year. Liquidity variables, volume 
and shares outstanding, are from Datastream. Ownership structure data for cross-listed firms is 
made available to us by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), Claessens, Djankov, and 
Lang (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), and Lins (2003). When a firm is not available in their 
database, the information is collected from the annual report (20-F) closest to the cross-listing year 
or from the firms’ corporate websites. 13  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) 
recommend a 10 percent ownership cut off point to determine control within a firm as this level 
provides a significant level of voting power and also since countries often mandate the disclosure 
of at least a 10 percent ownership stakes.  
Cross-listing studies have a potential endogeneity bias since firms self-select to participate 
in the cross-listing “treatment”. To control for this issue we find benchmark firms one year prior 
to the cross-listing year based on industry, growth opportunities (sales growth), firm size (book 
value of assets), and country legal origin.14 We employ the coarsened exact matching (CEM) 
procedure put forward by Blackwell, Iacus, King, and Porro (2009). Coarsened exact matching 
requires fewer assumptions, is more easily automated, and possesses more attractive statistical 
properties for many applications than do other existing matching methods. This methodology 
matches each treated (cross-listed) firm with the firm that has the most similar properties in the 
universe of non-treated firms or with a group of firms that share similar characteristics. When 
CEM provides more than one matching firm, we proceed with a one-to-many matching procedure 
by creating value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolios as the cross-listing benchmarks. 
                                                          
13 The SEC requires foreign issuers to disclose in Form 20-F the names of person(s) known to own more than 10 
percent of the issuer’s voting shares. Yet, officers and directors can report share ownership as a group (Licht, 2003). 
Insiders’ related parties are to be considered part of the insider ownership. In addition, firms are required to disclose 
whether the ownership structure makes use of shares with different voting rights (www.sec.gov). 
14 Charitou and Louca (2009) match firms based on total assets and industry. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) 
controls for country level variables, global industry q, size, and sales growth. 
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Table 1 shows the list of emerging markets from which the sample of cross-listed and non-
cross-listed firms is drawn. Our list of countries is primarily based on Fernandez and Ferrreira 
(2008). The sample of matching firms employed to create benchmark portfolios includes 23.13% 
of non-cross-listed firms from China, 19.98% from South Korea and 19.41% from Taiwan. 
Similarly, Exchange-traded cross-listings are dominated by Chinese firms with 29% of the total 
cross-listings from emerging countries. However, as a region, Latin American countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela) originate 47.7% of the total number of 
cross-listings suggesting a strong linkage between firms from these countries and U.S. stock 
markets. All of the 3334 non-cross-listed firms were used to create portfolios that match the 
characteristics of each of the 217 cross-listed firms, as suggested by the CEM. Using portfolios as 
benchmarks reduces the volatility of single firms and therefore provides more reliable measures 
of adjusted performance. Table 2 offers a detailed description of the set of variables used in our 
econometric models and define their source. Our variables of interest Insider-Owner, 
OwnerConcentration, Dual-Class, and their corresponding interactions are described at the 
beginning of Table 2. In addition, we are interested on the effects of the variables Cross-Listed, 
Capital-Raising, and SOX, which are described next to the ownership structure variables in Table 
2. The remaining regressors are control variables. To remove outliers the data is winsorized at the 
99 and one percentile.  
[Table 1 and Table 2 about here] 
Table 3, Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of the cross-listed firms. An average of 
2.216 analysts follow (Coverage) each firm in our sample in any given year. However, the number 
increases if we measure only the three-year period after cross-listing as the variable Coverage-
POST indicate that there are 3.286 analysts per firm. In addition, the mean turnover for the total 
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sample of cross-listed firms indicates that firms have an annual dollar volume equal to 1.1 times 
their market capitalization. As it has been described in earlier literature (Foerster and Karolyi, 
2000), liquidity increases after firms cross-list in the United States. The average turnover in the 
three years after firms cross-list (Turnover-POST) is higher (3.286) than the pre-cross-listing 
turnover (Turnover-PRE) of 2.216. Moreover, whereas the mean annual abnormal return (AR) is 
0.045%, the three-year pre-cross-listing abnormal returns (BHAR-PRE) and post-cross-listing 
abnormal returns (BHAR-POST) are in sharp contrast, with 46.67% and -3.897% returns 
respectively. Operating performance is proxied by operating income before depreciation (OIBD), 
similar to Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Charitou and Louca (2009). The OIBD for the group of 
cross-listed firms has an average value of 14.771% and the matching-firm adjusted operating 
performance (ExcessOIBD) has an average value of 2.599%. 
[Table 3 about here]     
Table 3 Panel B presents the frequency of the categorical variables. From the total sample, 
there are 44% firm/year observations with insider-ownership. As expected in our sample of 
emerging-market firms, the majority (95%) of the firm/year observations are recorded as having 
ownership concentration (OwnerConcentration), yet, only 18% use dual-class share structure 
(Dual-Class). When we interact the OwnerConcentration and Dual-Class variables we observe 
that the percentage of observations does not differ from the frequency of Dual-Class alone, 
suggesting that only firms with ownership concentration tend to use a dual-class share structure. 
Most of the cross-listing observations (86%) come from firms whose home countries are defined 
as Civil Law (Civil). Similarly, most cross-listings (78%) tend to choose the NYSE as their host 
stock exchange. Lastly, the sample is almost equally balanced between capital-raising and non-
capital-raising firms; with 47% and 53% of the total firm/year observations respectively.  
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4. Research design 
4.1 Firm performance 
Stock returns are calculated using the approach of Loughran and Ritter (1995), Foerster 
and Karolyi (2000), and Charitou and Louca (2009) as these studies also analyze returns over long 
time periods. Ri,y and Ri,m are the yearly and monthly returns of firm i, respectively. Ri,y is calculated 
by geometrically compounding the monthly returns for the corresponding year. 
12
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We calculate abnormal returns (AR) using the matching-firm adjusted returns of cross-
listed firms. The geometrically compounded returns of the corresponding benchmark is subtracted 
from those of the cross-listed firm i.15   
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i
i y i y yAR R R   (2)
 
Where Riy is the annual geometrically compounded return of the matching firms. ARi,y 
serves as the dependent variables in the panel regressions of stock returns. We additionally 
calculate the three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR). We estimate the geometric three-
year stock returns for firm i as: 
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Where t and T are the beginning and ending years. We calculate BHAR for the three years 
before cross-listing (BHAR-PRE) and the three years after cross-listing (BHAR-POST). T can take 
the value of three and minus three years (with reference to the cross-listing year). BHAR are 
                                                          
15 When a portfolio of matching firms is used, we estimate both equal-weighted and value-weighted matching-firm 
stock returns.   
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employed as dependent variables in the cross-sectional estimations. Lastly, to evaluate the 
performance of the portfolio of cross-listed firms we calculate the average annual abnormal returns 
(ARy) and show the trend in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The portfolio’s average annual abnormal returns 
are estimated in the form:
  
,
1
1 y
y i y
y i
N
AR
N
AR

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y= -5,…, -1, 1,…, 10            (4) 
To measure operating performance, we employ operating income before depreciation 
(OIBD) similar to Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Charitou and Louca (2009). OIBD equals to 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) deflated by the book 
value of total assets. Abnormal operating performance (ExcessOIBD) is estimated as follows: 
, ,
i
i y i y yExcessOIBD OIBD OIBD   (5) 
Where OIBDiy is the matching-firm operating performance. OIBDi,y serves as the 
dependent variables in the panel regressions of operating performance.  
4.2 Multivariate regressions 
The multivariate regression model shown in (6) is employed to analyze the dependent 
variables operating performance and abnormal returns. 
1
k
j
it j it i it
j
Performance x v  

      (6)
 
Where the dependent variable Performancei,t takes the form of excess operating 
performance (ExcessOIBDi,y) or abnormal returns (ARi,y) for firm i during year t. μ is a constant 
and vit is an idiosyncratic error term. αi represents firm fixed effects and, alternatively, country 
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fixed effects.16 xit is the group of j control variables described in Table 2. These regressors are 
similar to those used in Charitou and Louca (2009), however, our models include a set of variables 
of interest (ownership structure) and controls for investor recognition.  
We use pooled OLS regressions with robust standard errors given the latent presence of 
autocorrelation in panel data. In addition, firm clusters are included in our model as F-tests 
determine that the intercepts differ across units. Moreover, we use Hausman-Taylor random effects 
as a robustness check. Random effects require that Cov(xit vi)=0. Yet, Hausman (1978) tests 
indicate that there is endogeneity of the regressors with the firm random effects; hence the random 
effects approach is not feasible. The alternative fixed effects model is not suitable as the sample 
contains time-invariant regressors, such as the ownership structure dummy variables. However, 
the Hausman-Taylor estimator can accommodate random effects panel models when there is 
endogeneity of the regressors with the firm random effects and assumes that some (but not all) of 
the regressors in x and z are correlated with ui but none correlated with ei.   
When the panel model specifications are tested on subsamples, seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) serve to statistically compare variables’ coefficients across groups. Moreover, 
to check the robustness of our results, we run separate cross-sectional regressions on the three-year 
BHAR before firm i cross-lists (BHAR-PRE) and the three-year BHAR after cross-listing (BHAR-
POST) to compare the effect of ownership structure on the pre- and post-cross-listing performance. 
Lastly, we continue the robustness tests using cross-sectional regressions on the subsamples, 
before and after the SOX, employing SUR models.  
 
                                                          
16 We note that the set of dependent variables (ExcessOIBD and AR) account for the time effect as these variables are 
contemporaneously matching-firm adjusted.  
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5. Empirical results 
5.1 Univariate tests 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the trend of average annual abnormal returns (ARy). Figure 1 
suggests that the abnormal stock returns decline following the cross-listing event. However, when 
the cross-listed firm has insider-ownership, there is a clearer downward trend in stock returns as 
revealed in Figure 2.17 We present the results of non-parametric univariate tests in Table 4.18  Panel 
A shows that, on average, firms do not earn long-term positive abnormal returns after cross-listing. 
Worse yet, firms significantly underperform their pre-cross-listing returns in four out of the ten 
post-cross-listing years. Further, Table 4 Panel A segments the sample by insider-ownership 
category. Our results indicate that the stock returns of insider-owned cross-listings have declined 
substantially after the cross-listing event. Abnormal returns are significantly lower than during the 
pre-cross-listing period. However, the group of firms without significant insider ownership does 
not appear to underperform in the post-cross-listing period. In sum, univariate tests in Panel A 
provide some evidence in support of the market-timing hypothesis for insider-owned firms. 
Moreover, Table 4 Panel B indicate that the arithmetic mean return corresponding to the first cross-
listed year and the three pre-cross-listing years is significantly higher than the mean return for the 
subsequent two years when the firm is insider-controlled as, on average, the decline in stock returns 
equals -18.61%. The average decline for all the firms is -10.46%, which is significant in parametric 
and non-parametric tests of mean differences. However, the decline for non-insider-controlled 
firms equals to only -4.40% and is not significant. Lastly, the difference-in-difference (D-i-D) test 
show that the mean change in returns (from the pre- to the post-cross-listing period) is significantly 
                                                          
17 The figures show values of performance adjusted using value-weighted portfolios.  
18  Parametric and non-parametric tests in offer similar results, supporting differences across insider-ownership 
categories. 
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lower (-14.21%) for the insider-owned firms than for the non-insider-owned firms. Overall, the 
univariate tests shown in Table 4 suggests that the decline in stock returns following a cross listing 
event is statistically significant for insider-controlled firms and the decline in returns is stronger 
than for non-insider-controlled firms.  
[Figure 1 - 2 about here] 
[Table 4 about here] 
5.2 Operating performance  
Table 5 shows the results of pooled OLS regressions with firm fixed effects using operating 
performance as the dependent variable. The negative sign of dummy variable Cross-Listed 
suggests that firms experience a decline in operating performance following a U.S. cross-listing 
event. The drop in operating performance is even stronger for insider-owned firms since they have 
about a three percent larger negative reaction compared to non-insider-owned as indicated by the 
InsiderCrossListed variable. However, having a dual-class share structure does not influence the 
post-cross-listing performance as the variable Owner*Dual-Class is not significant in any of the 
models. Additionally, we note that capital-raising cross-listings have better operating performance 
than their non-capital-raising counterpart, consistent with previous findings (Charitou and Louca, 
2009). When the sample is split into capital-raising and non-capital-raising cross-listings in Table 
6, our SUR results provide evidence that the coefficients are significantly different across both 
subsamples. We note that whereas capital-raising cross-listings do not appear to have a significant 
change in operating performance following a U.S. cross-listing event, non-capital-raising cross-
listings have an average post-cross-listing deterioration of operating performance of more than 
three percent when they are insider-controlled. StockMarket indicates that firms with more 
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developed stock markets in their home country benefit the least from cross-listing (Table 5); 
however, this negative effect seems to be more severe for capital-raising cross-listings. 
Conversely, the number of analysts following a firm seems to have a positive outcome only on the 
operating performance of capital-raising cross-listings. 
[Tables 5 - 6 about here] 
5.3 Abnormal returns  
Table 7 illustrates the effect of cross-listing and ownership structure on stock returns. We 
find that abnormal returns decline after cross-listing events. In addition, there is a stronger decline 
for firms with insider owners. Whereas all firms suffer from a reduction in excess returns following 
their cross-listing event, firms with insider ownership suffer a larger decline. Similarly, 
InsiderOwner supports the market timing hypothesis as insider-owned firms appear to have 
extraordinary stock returns only during the pre-cross-listing years.19 Table 8 presents results of 
SUR with subsamples. Panel A compares results before and after the SOX. The coefficients are 
significantly different across subsamples. The InsiderCrossListed coefficient is negative and 
significant before SOX. However, its effect decays once SOX is enacted, suggesting that this act 
has waned the underperformance following U.S. cross-listings. This implies that the managerial 
opportunistic behavior of cross-listed firms has been mitigated after SOX implementation. Panel 
B segments the sample based on whether the cross-listing is allowed to raise capital in the U.S. 
The coefficients are significantly different across the subsample of capital- and non-capital-raising 
groups. Ownership structure variables InsiderCrossListed and OwnerConcentration*Dual-Class 
are negative and significant only for capital-raising cross-listings, implying a higher sensitiveness 
                                                          
19 The negative coefficient of the variables Cross-Listed and InsiderCrossListed remain robust to the inclusion of the 
SOX and Rule 12h-6 dummy variables. These results are available upon request. On March 21, 2007, the SEC adopted 
the Exchange Act Rule 12h-6 that facilitates foreign private issuers deregistration process (www.sec.gov). 
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to potential agency problems. Investors appear more concerned about agency issues due to 
potential wealth expropriation by insiders when cross-listings have access to new equity capital, 
in spite of their previously described better operating performance. However, holding other things 
constant, Cross-Listed indicates that non-capital-raising firms experience a more substantial 
decline in stock returns following cross-listing events.  
[Tables 7 - 8 about here] 
Table 9 provides robustness checks employing Hausman-Taylor panel estimates with 
country fixed effects. Results confirm a decline in the long-term stock returns for insider-
controlled firms following cross-listing events. Further, we validate investors’ forward-looking 
attitude as they are able to anticipate the forthcoming change in operating performance one and 
two years ahead given the positive and significant coefficients of the leads of operating 
performance (ExcessOIBDt+1, and ExcessOIBDt+2). The negative effect of InsiderCrossListed 
remains robust after controlling for future operating performance, supporting that insider-owners 
time the cross-listing market. In Table 10, we provide results of our test of whether ownership 
structure explains the three-year cumulative abnormal returns before cross-listing (BHAR-PRE) 
and after cross-listing (BHAR-POST). Cross-sectional regressions confirm that insider-controlled 
firms significantly outperform their non-insider-controlled counterparts during the pre-cross-
listing years. However, subsequent to cross-listing the results reverse and insider-controlled cross-
listings earn lower abnormal returns than firms that are non-insider-controlled. The InsiderOwner 
coefficient shifts from positive, when the dependent variable is BHAR-PRE, to negative when the 
dependent variable is BHAR-POST. Moreover, the StockMarket coefficient confirms that cross-
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listings from countries with more developed stock markets earn lower returns in both pre- and 
post-cross-listing periods.20  
Table 11 provides cross-sectional regression results of subsamples segmented by year, 
before and after the enactment of SOX. The coefficients are significantly different across 
subsamples only 50% of the time. However, we observe a strong pattern where InsiderOwner has 
a negative impact only in the pre-SOX period, consistent with our previous results from Table 8, 
Panel A where SOX is shown to reduce the attempts to time the cross-listing market. The sample 
of firms with insider-ownership has a major decline in abnormal returns after cross-listing only in 
the years preceding the enactment of SOX.  
[Tables 9 - 11 about here] 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
We investigate the long-term performance of emerging-market firms cross-listed in the 
U.S. evaluating the implications of ownership structure on operating performance and stock 
returns. Managers of insider-controlled firms choose to cross-list following extraordinary 
performance, consistent with the market timing hypothesis. Insiders commonly take advantage of 
this window of opportunity by diluting their ownership or transferring control of the cross-listed 
firm as indicated by Ayyagari and Doidge (2010). Insider-owned cross-listings from emerging 
markets have substantial abnormal returns before cross-listing whereas abnormal returns turn to 
negative in the years subsequent to cross-listing. It appears that the SOX has largely reduced the 
stock losses following U.S. cross-listings. The managerial opportunism behavior of insider-owners 
                                                          
20 When we employ the five-year post-cross-listing abnormal returns on similar cross-sectional regressions, our 
results remain robust and our main conclusion is supported. These additional results are available upon request.  
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has been mitigated following the enactment of the SOX. Moreover, consistent with literature on 
capital-raising events, investors appear more concerned about potential agency conflicts when 
capital-raising firms are insider-controlled as the stock returns reflect a significant sensitiveness to 
insider ownership.  
This manuscript has relevant implications for academics, practitioners, and policy makers 
since the cross-listing literature has not tested the role played by ownership structure on the long-
term performance of emerging-markets cross-listed firms. In addition, U.S. investors can evaluate 
the expected performance of cross-listed firms considering ownership structure and capital-raising 
intentions in constructing internationally diversified portfolios involving emerging-market 
corporations. We also convey solid arguments in support of policies aiming at increasing the 
accountability of foreign corporate executives with the intention of protecting U.S. stock market 
participants.  
As regulatory bodies imposed more stringent requirements to U.S. exchange-traded firms 
due to the SOX, several firms became reluctant to remain cross-listed on U.S. stock exchanges, 
which may grant insiders greater discretion to consume private benefits without the scrutiny of 
U.S. regulators (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2010). According to Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2010), 
foreign firms with more agency problems have more negative stock-price reactions following their 
delisting from U.S. markets. The mechanisms of how ownership structure affects the delisting 
decision and to what extent insider owners influence the post-delisting performance remain 
unknown. We leave these questions open for future research.  
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Figure 1 
 
Abnormal Returns of Cross-listed firms 
Figure 1 shows the average abnormal returns earned by firms during each cross-listing year. 
Abnormal returns are matching-firm adjusted and their average is equally weighted. Cross-listed 
firms are exchange-traded (ADR level 2 and level 3). 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Abnormal Returns of Cross-listed firms by Insider-ownership category 
Figure 2 illustrates the average abnormal returns categorized by ownership structure and cross-
listing year. Abnormal returns are matching-firm adjusted and their average is equally weighted. 
Cross-listed firms are exchange-traded (ADR level 2 and level 3). 
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Table 1 
Frequency of sample firms by home country  
 
Panel A. Matching firms  Panel B. Cross-listed firms 
   
No. Country Frequency Percent  Country Frequency Percent 
1 
 
 
Argentina 25 0.75  Argentina 14 6.45 
2 Brazil 39 1.17  Brazil 35 16.13 
3 Chile 76 2.28  Chile 13 5.99 
4 China 771 23.13  China 63 29.03 
5 Colombia 12 0.36  Colombia 0 0.00 
6 Czech Republic 7 0.21  Czech Republic 0 0.00 
7 Hong Kong 134 4.02  Hong Kong 9 4.15 
8 Hungary 14 0.42  Hungary 1 0.46 
9 India 111 3.33  India 13 5.99 
10 Indonesia 128 3.84  Indonesia 2 0.92 
11 Malaysia 107 3.21  Malaysia 0 0.00 
12 Mexico 42 1.26  Mexico 31 14.29 
13 Pakistan 13 0.39  Pakistan 0 0.00 
14 Peru 34 1.02  Peru 1 0.46 
15 Philippines 66 1.98  Philippines 3 1.38 
16 Poland 77 2.31  Poland 0 0.00 
17 Russia 61 1.83  Russia 5 2.30 
18 Singapore 62 1.86  Singapore 1 0.46 
19 South Africa 47 1.41  South Africa 6 2.76 
20 South Korea 666 19.98  South Korea 8 3.69 
21 Sri Lanka 4 0.12  Sri Lanka 0 0.00 
22 Taiwan 647 19.41  Taiwan 8 3.69 
23 Thailand 74 2.22  Thailand 0 2.22 
24 Turkey 111 3.33  Turkey 1 0.00 
25 Venezuela 6 0.18   Venezuela 3 1.38 
 Total 3,334 100.00  Total 217 100.00 
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Table 2 
Variables description 
 
Variable Description Source 
Insider Owner Insider Owner indicates that the firm has an insider owner or group of insider 
owners  
Form 20-F; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (1999); Claessens, Djankov, 
and Lang (2000); Lins (2003). 
 with at least 10% claim in the company. 
OwnerConcentration Indicates that there is at least one investor that owns at least 10% of the firm. 
InsiderCrossListed. Shows whether the firm cross-listed has insider ownership. 
Dual-Class 
Indicates whether the firm uses more than one class of stock with different 
voting rights. 
Owner*Dual-Class Represents the interaction of OwnerConcentration * Dual-Class. 
Cross-Listed Cross-Listing dummy equals one during the listing year and thereafter. 
Bank of New York, Citibank, and Chase 
Bank depository receipts websites. 
Capital-Raising Capital-Raising indicates that the cross-listing firm is an ADR level 3. 
SOX Equals one during 2002 and thereafter.  
Global Equals one if the firm cross-listed after 1997, the globalization period 
Civil Indicates the legal origin, civil or common law. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (2000) Antidirectors Is the Antidirectors rights index from the firm’s home country. 
Coverage The number of estimations from different analysts reported by I/B/E/S.  
I/B/E/S 
Coverage-POST Coverage-POST is the post-cross-listing three-year median value of Coverage. 
Total Assets Book value of total assets is in Millions of USD. 
Datastream Thomson Reuters  
MarketCap MarketCap is the market capitalization in billions of USD. 
SizeDifferential Difference in Size (log of total assets in U.S.) with matching firms. 
Returns 
Equals the annual stock returns, estimated as the product of the 12-month 
stock returns. 
AR Abnormal returns equal the matching-firm adjusted stock returns. 
BHAR-PRE BHAR_PRE is the pre-cross-listing 3-year buy-and-hold abnormal return. 
BHAR-POST BHAR_POST is the post-cross-listing 3-year buy-and-hold abnormal return. 
OIBD Equals the adjusted operating income before depreciation deflated by total 
assets. ExcessOIBD Represents the matching-firm adjusted OIBD. 
Turnover Turnover equals annual volume divided by total number of shares outstanding. 
Turnover-PRE Turnover-PRE is the three-year pre-cross-listing turnover. 
Turnover-POST Turnover-POST is the three-year post-cross-listing turnover. 
StockMarket 
Equals the ratio of the aggregate market value of listed shares in the cross-
listing home country deflated by the corresponding GDP  
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 
(2000) 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Continuous variables 
Antidirectors represent the Antidirectors rights index from the firms’ home country. StockMarket measures the 
domestic stock market development. It equals the aggregate market value of listed shares in the cross-listing home 
divided by GDP. Total Assets are in Billions of USD. MarketCap is the Market Capitalization in Billions of USD. 
Coverage is the number of analyst following the firm or the number of estimations from different analysts reported by 
I/B/E/S database. Coverage-POST is the post cross-listing three-year median value of Coverage. Turnover equals the 
annual trading volume divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Turnover-PRE (Turnover-POST) is the pre 
(post) cross-listing three-year turnover. Returns are the annual stock returns. Returns are calculated as the product of 
the 12-month stock returns. Abnormal returns (AR) represent the matching-firm adjusted stock returns. BHAR-POST 
(BHAR-PRE) is the post (pre) cross-listing three-year buy and hold abnormal return. OIBD is the operating income 
before depreciation adjusted by book value of total assets. ExcessOIBD equals the matching-firm adjusted OIBD. 
 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Coverage 2,709 2.216 3.73 0.00 29.00 
Coverage-POST 651 3.286 3.60 0.00 20.00 
Turnover 1,530 1.101 2.99 0.00 24.67 
Turnover-PRE 330 0.803 2.71 0.00 24.67 
Turnover-POST 594 1.348 3.36 0.00 24.67 
Returns (%) 1,703 19.459 55.89 -56.27 150.56 
AR (%) 1,698 0.045 51.59 -113.40 140.82 
BHAR-POST (%) 156 -3.897 86.59 -115.68 377.46 
BHAR-PRE (%) 69 46.675 159.37 -104.49 833.56 
OIBD (%) 2,062 14.771 11.73 -29.28 43.24 
ExcessOIBD (%) 2,051 2.499 11.96 -54.05 51.77 
TotalAssets 2,140 6.304 16.60 0.00 309.00 
MarketCap 1,900 6.519 19.70 0.00 326.00 
Antidirectors 2,709 3.198 1.62 1.00 5.00 
StockMarket 2,614 1.513 1.77 0.00 7.43 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Descriptive statistics 
Panel B. Frequency of categorical variables 
Insider Owner indicates that the firm has an insider owner or group of insider owners with at least 10% claim in the 
company. OwnerConcentration indicates that there is at least one investor, insider or outsider that owns at least 10% 
of the firm. Dual-class equals to one if the firm uses more than one class of stock and with different voting rights. 
CapitalRaising indicates that the cross-listing is level 3. SOX equals one during and after the approval of SOX (2002). 
NYSE is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s host stock exchange is the NYSE. Civil indicates the legal 
origin civil or common law. Cross-Listed equals to one during the cross-listing year and thereafter. There are 115 
(53%) non-insider-controlled cross-listings and 102 (47%) insider-controlled.  
 
Variable Total Yes/No N % 
InsiderOwner 2,664 Yes 1,179 44% 
  No 1,485 56% 
OwnerConcentration 2,709 Yes 2,571 95% 
  No 138 5% 
Dual-Class  2,651 Yes 480 18% 
  No 2,171 82% 
CapitalRaising 2,709 Yes 1,281 47% 
  No 1,428 53% 
SOX 2,709 Yes 981 36% 
  No 1,728 64% 
NYSE 2,709 Yes 2,123 78% 
  No 586 22% 
Civil  2,709 Yes 2,322 86% 
  No 387 14% 
InsiderOwner * Cross-Listed 2,664 Yes 700 26% 
  No 1,964 74% 
OwnerConcentration * Dual-Class 2,651 Yes 465 18% 
  No 2,186 82% 
InsiderOwner * Dual-Class 2,651 Yes 306 12% 
  No 2,345 88% 
InsiderOwner * CapitalRaising 2,664 Yes 735 28% 
  No 1,929 72% 
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Table 4 
Univariate Tests 
Panel A. Univariate tests of abnormal stock returns before and after cross-listing relative to the cross-listing year.  
Panel A1: Non-parametric Wilcoxon paired signed rank tests show whether abnormal returns (AR) after cross-listing are significantly different than abnormal 
returns two years before cross-listing. Panel A2: Non-parametric Wilcoxon paired signed rank tests show whether insider-controlled (non-insider-controlled) 
firms’ post-cross-listing abnormal returns are significantly different than their abnormal stock returns two years before cross-listing. Equal-weighted 
portfolios of matching firms are used in univariate tests.  
 
Years relative to cross-listing event 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Panel A1          
All Firms            
N 138 138 138 138 136 118 112 110 104 90 80 
AR After  0.18 0.09 -0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.08 0.08 0.01 -0.06 -0.15 -0.12 
AR Before 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 
Difference 0.06 -0.03 -0.13 -0.07 -0.10 -0.24** -0.07 -0.13 -0.21* -0.31** -0.28*** 
            
Panel A2            
Insider-Owned Firms           
N 56 56 56 56 56 46 42 40 38 34 32 
AR After  0.16 0.05 0.00 -0.04 0.01 -0.11 0.19 0.01 -0.08 -0.20 -0.15 
AR Before 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.37 0.43 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.35 
Difference -0.18 -0.28* -0.33* -0.38** -0.33* -0.48** -0.23 -0.38** -0.48** -0.60*** -0.50** 
          
Non-Insider-Owned Firms          
N 82 82 82 82 80 72 70 70 66 56 48 
AR After  0.17 0.13 0.00 0.12 0.07 -0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.13 -0.11 
AR Before  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 
Difference 0.20 0.16 0.03 0.16 0.09 -0.08 0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.13 -0.14 
 
* z<.10, ** z<.05, *** z<.01. 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Univariate Tests 
Panel B. Univariate tests of stock returns before and after cross-listing by Insider-Ownership Category. 
Non-parametric Wilcoxon paired signed rank tests show whether the arithmetic mean returns during the cross-listing year and up to three years before cross-
listing (Pre-Cross-Listing) is significantly higher than the mean return during the two years subsequent to the cross-listing event (Post-Cross-Listing). The 
column Differences-in-Differences shows the tests of whether the change in returns (Δ Returns) from the pre-cross-listing to the post-cross-listing period 
differ significantly by Insider ownership category (Insider-Owner versus Non-Insider-Owner). We additionally show the parametric one-tailed t-tests of 
mean differences with unequal variances in the last row. 
 
 
  All Firms Insider-Owner Non-Insider-Owner Difference-in-Differences 
Firms 155 66 89  
Post-Cross-Listing 12.63% 5.77% 17.73%  
Pre-Cross-Listing 23.09% 24.38% 22.13%  
Difference (Δ Returns) -10.46% * -18.61% ** -4.40% -14.21% * 
t-test ** *** - * 
 
Wilcoxon: * z<.10, ** z<.05, *** z<.01; t-test: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
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Table 5 
Pooled ordinary least squares.  
Dependent variable: ExcessOIBD. Civil indicates the legal origin Civil or common law. Antidirectors represent the Antidirectors rights index. StockMarket is the 
domestic stock market development. Cross-Listed is a dummy variable equal to one in the Cross-Listing year and thereafter. NYSE is a dummy variable if the 
firm’s host stock exchange is the NYSE. CapitalRaising indicates that the cross-listing is level 3. Size Differential is the difference in log Assets with matching 
firm. InsiderCrossListed is the interaction Cross-Listed*InsiderOwner. Ownership Concentration indicates that there is at least one investor, insider or outsider, 
that owns at least 10% of the firm. Dual-class equals to one if the firm uses more than one class of stock and with different voting rights. Owner*Dual-Class is 
the interaction OwnerConcentration*Dual-class. InsiderOwner indicates that the firm has an insider-owner or group of insider-owners with at least 10% claim in 
the company. Coverage is the number of analysts following the firm or the number of estimations from different analysts reported by I/B/E/S database.  
 
   EW   MW  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cross-Listed -0.020 -0.024* -0.024* -0.028** -0.032** -0.032** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
InsiderCrossListed -0.028 -0.030* -0.030* -0.035* -0.037** -0.037** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Civil 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.005 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Antidirectors -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
StockMarket -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
NYSE 0.039** 0.038** 0.038** 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
CapitalRaising 0.040*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
SizeDifferential 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Owner*Dual-Class 0.005 0.003  -0.001 -0.003  
 (0.012) (0.012)  (0.013) (0.012)  
InsiderOwner 0.027 0.025 0.026 0.016 0.014 0.013 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
Coverage  0.003** 0.003***  0.003*** 0.003*** 
    (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) 
N 1936 1936 1946 1939 1939 1949 
Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.104 0.113 0.113 0.075 0.083 0.083 
F 8.75 8.91 8.76 5.27 5.80 6.36 
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
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Table 6 
Seemingly unrelated regressions by capital-raising category.  
Dependent variable: ExcessOIBD. Civil indicates the legal origin Civil or common law. Antidirectors represent the Antidirectors rights index. StockMarket is the 
domestic stock market development. InsiderOwner indicates that the firm has an insider-owner or group of insider-owners with at least 10% claim in the company. 
Dual-class equals to one if the firm uses a dual-class share structure. Owner*Dual-Class is the interaction OwnerConcentration*Dual-class. NYSE is a dummy 
variable if the firm’s host stock exchange is the NYSE. SizeDifferential is the difference in log Assets with matching firm. Cross-Listed is a dummy variable equal 
to one in the Cross-Listing year and thereafter. InsiderCrossListed is the interaction Cross-Listed*InsiderOwner. InsideOwnerDual is the interaction Dual-Class * 
Insider Owner. Coverage is the number of analysts following the firm or the number of estimations from different analysts reported by I/B/E/S database. 
CapitalRaising indicates that the cross-listing is level 3. 
 
 EW MW 
 CR NCR CR NCR CR NCR CR NCR 
Cross-Listed -0.018 -0.015 -0.029 -0.012 -0.019 -0.019 -0.032* -0.016 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) 
InsiderCrossListed 0.025 -0.022* 0.013 -0.030** 0.006 -0.039** -0.005 -0.047*** 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) 
Civil 0.049*** -0.005 0.037** -0.007 0.054*** -0.021 0.042** -0.023 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) 
Antidirectors -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
StockMarket -0.010*** -0.007 -0.009*** -0.008 -0.014*** -0.011** -0.013*** -0.011** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
NYSE 0.035 0.051*** 0.032 0.054*** 0.036* 0.065*** 0.033 0.067*** 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
SizeDifferential 0.013** 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.014** 0.001 0.008 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Owner*Dual-Class -0.024 0.026**   -0.036 0.020   
 (0.022) (0.012)   (0.023) (0.012)   
InsideOwnerDual   -0.011 0.035**   -0.023 0.033* 
   (0.023) (0.018)   (0.026) (0.019) 
Coverage   0.006*** 0.000   0.005*** 0.000 
   (0.002) (0.001)   (0.002) (0.001) 
Const -4.133*** -4.468*** -4.156*** -4.468*** -4.112*** -4.448*** -4.130*** -4.451*** 
 (0.100) (0.094) (0.093) (0.094) (0.094) (0.096) (0.087) (0.096) 
N 1936   1936   1939   1939   
Firm Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Chi 2 25.07  25.67  27.98  28.25  
Significantly Different? ***  ***  ***  ***  
Clusters 212  212  212  212  
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.  
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Table 7 
Pooled ordinary least squares.  
Dependent variable: Abnormal Returns (AR). Civil indicates the legal origin Civil or common law. Antidirectors 
equal the Antidirectors rights index. StockMarket is the Domestic Stock market development. Cross-Listed is a 
dummy variable equal to one in the Cross-Listing year and thereafter. Dual-class equals to one if the firm uses more 
than one class of stock and with different voting rights. NYSE is a dummy variable if the firm’s host stock exchange 
is the NYSE. Size Differential is the difference in log Assets with matching firm. InsiderOwner indicates that the 
firm has an insider-owner or group of insider-owners with at least 10% claim in the company. InsiderCrossListed is 
the interaction Cross-Listed*InsiderOwner. OwnerConcentration indicates that there is at least one investor, insider 
or outsider, that owns at least 10% of the firm. Coverage is the number of analysts following the firm or the number 
of estimations from different analysts reported by I/B/E/S database.  
 
 EW MW  
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)   
Cross-listed -0.054 -0.052 -0.043 -0.075* -0.071* -0.06  
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038)  
InsiderCrossListed -0.166** -0.168** -0.172** -0.135* -0.138* -0.143*  
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.078)  
Civil -0.007 -0.005 0.008 -0.035 -0.033 -0.017   
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.038) (0.032) (0.032) (0.037)  
Antidirectors 0.009 0.008 0.012 0.005 0.004 0.009  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)  
StockMarket -0.018** -0.019** -0.016* -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.022**  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)  
NYSE 0.054 0.058 0.066 0.071* 0.074* 0.086**  
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.043) (0.038) (0.039) (0.043)  
SizeDifferential -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.009 -0.009 -0.005  
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  
InsiderOwner 0.137* 0.144* 0.156** 0.068 0.074 0.091  
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.073)  
Dual-Class  -0.025   -0.022   
  (0.030)   (0.035)   
OwnerConcentration   -0.038   -0.049  
   (0.066)   (0.069)  
Coverage   -0.005   -0.006  
      (0.003)     (0.004)   
N 1558 1548 1558 1558 1548 1558  
Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
R2 0.022 0.023 0.024 0.042 0.042 0.044  
F 3.951 3.567 3.281 9.555 8.759 7.294   
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.  
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Table 8 
Seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR).  
Panel A. Before and After SOX. 
Dependent variable: Abnormal Returns (AR). Civil indicates the legal origin Civil or common law. Antidirectors equal 
the Antidirectors rights index. StockMarket is the Domestic Stock market development. Cross-Listed is a dummy 
variable equal to one in the Cross-Listing year and thereafter. Dual-class equals to one if the firm uses more than one 
class of stock and with different voting rights. NYSE is a dummy variable if the firm’s host stock exchange is the 
NYSE. SizeDifferential is the difference in log Assets with matching firm. InsiderOwner indicates that the firm has 
an insider-owner or group of insider-owners with at least 10% claim in the company. InsiderCrossListed is the 
interaction Cross-Listed*InsiderOwner. OwnerConcentration indicates that there is at least one investor, insider or 
outsider, that owns at least 10% of the firm. Owner*Dual-Class is the interaction OwnerConcentration*Dual-class. 
Coverage is the number of analysts following the firm or the number of estimations from different analysts reported 
by I/B/E/S database. 
 
 (1) 
(1) 
(2) 
(2) 
(3) 
(3)  After Before After Before After Before 
Cross-Listed -0.026 -0.097** -0.023 -0.092** -0.026 -0.093** 
 (0.091) (0.043) (0.090) (0.044) (0.089) (0.044) 
InsiderCrossListed -0.019 -0.229** -0.027 -0.227** -0.023 -0.228** 
 (0.121) (0.098) (0.119) (0.097) (0.121) (0.097) 
Civil -0.098* 0.063* -0.093* 0.064* -0.094* 0.063* 
 (0.051) (0.036) (0.051) (0.036) (0.052) (0.036) 
Antidirectors 0.003 0.013* 0.002 0.013 0.003 0.013* 
 (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) 
StockMarket -0.020* 0.001 -0.019 0.000 -0.018 0.000 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Owner*Dual-Class -0.015 -0.01 -0.014 -0.011   
 (0.061) (0.036) (0.062) (0.036)   
NYSE 0.103* 0.004 0.106* 0.008 0.105* 0.006 
 (0.059) (0.041) (0.060) (0.043) (0.059) (0.042) 
SizeDifferential 0.01 -0.003 0.013 0.00 0.012 -0.001 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.021) (0.014) (0.020) (0.014) 
InsiderOwner -0.003 0.222** 0.009 0.224** 0.002 0.222** 
 (0.104) (0.096) (0.101) (0.095) (0.097) (0.096) 
Coverage   -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
   (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
Const -1.498*** -1.299*** -1.496*** -1.298*** -1.499*** -1.301*** 
 (0.078) (0.050) (0.078) (0.050) (0.078) (0.050) 
N 1548   1548   1558   
Firm Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Chi 2 21.85  20.95  20.83  
Significantly Different? ***  **  **  
Cluster 177  177  178  
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.  
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Table 8 (continued) 
Seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR).  
Panel B. SUR by Capital-Raising Category 
Dependent variable: Abnormal Returns (AR). Civil indicates the legal origin Civil or common law. Antidirectors 
represent the Antidirectors rights index. StockMarket is the domestic stock market development. Cross-Listed is a 
dummy variable equal to one in the Cross-Listing year and thereafter. Dual-class equals to one if the firm uses more 
than one class of stock and with different voting rights. NYSE is a dummy variable if the firm’s host stock exchange 
is the NYSE. SizeDifferential is the difference in log Assets with matching firm. InsiderOwner indicates that the firm 
has an insider-owner or group of insider-owners with at least 10% claim in the company. InsiderCrossListed is the 
interaction Cross-Listed*InsiderOwner. OwnerConcentration indicates that there is at least one investor, insider or 
outsider that owns at least 10% of the firm. Owner*Dual-Class is the interaction OwnerConcentration*Dual-class. 
InsideOwnerDual is the interaction Dual-Class * Insider Owner. Coverage is the number of analysts following the 
firm or the number of estimations from different analysts reported by I/B/E/S database. CapitalRaising indicates that 
the cross-listing is level 3. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 CR NCR CR NCR CR NCR 
Cross-Listed -0.084 -0.081* 0.035 -0.081* 0.015 -0.083* 
 (0.066) (0.043) (0.074) (0.046) (0.074) (0.046) 
InsiderCrossListed -0.095* -0.017 -0.367*** -0.041 -0.365*** -0.041 
 (0.053) (0.049) (0.134) (0.090) (0.133) (0.091) 
Civil -0.072 0.089* -0.054 0.043 -0.060 0.040 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.047) (0.036) (0.047) (0.037) 
Antidirectors 0.005 0.021* 0.006 0.010 0.009 0.009 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) 
StockMarket -0.021* -0.009 -0.020** -0.024* -0.018* -0.023* 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) 
Owner*Dual-Class   -0.143*** 0.048 -0.145*** 0.048 
   (0.049) (0.039) (0.048) (0.039) 
NYSE 0.070 0.047 0.105 0.018 0.097 0.014 
 (0.071) (0.049) (0.064) (0.037) (0.062) (0.037) 
SizeDifferential -0.037* -0.004 -0.019 0.005 -0.027* 0.003 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
OwnerConcentration 0.186** -0.140     
 (0.090) (0.102)     
Dual-Class -0.179** 0.070*     
 (0.079) (0.040)     
InsideOwnerDual 0.136 -0.018     
 (0.101) (0.073)     
InsiderOwner   0.343*** 0.014 0.325*** 0.010 
   (0.113) (0.084) (0.113) (0.086) 
Coverage   -0.007 -0.003   
   (0.006) (0.004)   
Const -1.269*** -1.396*** -1.280*** -1.393*** -1.279*** -1.394*** 
 (0.058) (0.060) (0.058) (0.061) (0.058) (0.061) 
N 1548  1548  1548  
Firm Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Chi 2 24.86  20.70  21.03  
Significantly Different? ***  **  **  
Cluster 177  177  177  
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.  
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Table 9 
Robustness checks. Hausman-Taylor panel estimates.  
Dependent variable: Abnormal Returns (AR). StockMarket represents the domestic stock market development. Cross-
Listed is a dummy variable equal to one in the Cross-Listing year and thereafter. SizeDifferential is the difference in 
log assets with matching firm. ExcessOIBD is the matching-firm adjusted operating performance. InsiderOwner 
indicates that the firm has an insider-owner or group of insider-owners with at least 10% claim in the company. 
InsiderCrossListed is the interaction Cross-Listed*InsiderOwner. Dual-class equals to one if the firm uses more than 
one class of stock and with different voting rights. Antidirectors equal the Antidirectors rights index. InsideOwnerDual 
is the interaction Dual-Class * Insider Owner. Coverage is the number of analysts following the firm or the number 
of estimations from different analysts reported by I/B/E/S database. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cross-Listed -0.066 -0.025 -0.026 -0.063 -0.012 -0.055 
 (0.043) (0.049) (0.049) (0.043) (0.049) (0.043) 
InsiderCrossListed -0.084* -0.184** -0.184** -0.091* -0.185** -0.081* 
 (0.047) (0.077) (0.078) (0.050) (0.077) (0.049) 
StockMarket 0.02 0.012 0.013 0.02 0.015 0.023 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
SizeDifferential -0.064*** -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.064*** -0.048** -0.050*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
ExcessOIBD t 0.064 0.064 0.059 0.061 0.072 0.068 
 (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.169) (0.169) 
ExcessOIBD t+1 0.743*** 0.738*** 0.736*** 0.740*** 0.765*** 0.765*** 
 (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) 
ExcessOIBD t+2 0.280* 0.268* 0.275* 0.276* 0.279* 0.285* 
 (0.160) (0.159) (0.159) (0.160) (0.158) (0.159) 
Antidirectors 0.01 0.008 0.008 0.01 0.005 0.007 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) 
Dual-Class 0.013  0.01    
 (0.065)  (0.064)    
InsiderOwner  0.133 0.135  0.150*  
  (0.083) (0.083)  (0.081)  
InsideOwnerDual    0.041  0.051 
    (0.076)  (0.074) 
Coverage     -0.010** -0.009** 
     (0.004) (0.004) 
N 1313 1323 1313 1313 1323 1313 
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
chi2 78.25 81.38 81.34 78.73 87.91 84.56 
F 3.26 3.39 3.25 3.28 3.52 3.38 
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.  
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Table 10 
Cross-sectional regressions 
1
BHAR
k
j
i j i i
j
x v 

    
Dependent Variable: Three-Year Abnormal Returns (BHAR-POST & BHAR-PRE). Civil indicates the legal origin 
Civil or common law. Antidirectors is the Antidirectors rights index. StockMarket is the domestic stock market 
development. NYSE is a dummy variable if the firm’s host stock exchange is the NYSE. SizeDifferential is the 
difference in log Assets with matching firm. InsiderOwner indicates that the firm has an insider-owner or group of 
insider-owners with at least 10% claim in the company. CapitalRaising indicates that the cross-listing is level 3. Dual-
Class equals to one if the firm uses more than one class of stock and with different voting rights. Global is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm cross-listed after 1997. Turnover-POST (Turnover-PRE) measures the turnover during 
the three-year post- (pre-) cross-listing period. Coverage-POST is the median number of analysts following a firm 
during the three years after cross-listing as reported by I/B/E/S database. InsideOwnerDual is the interaction Dual-
Class * Insider Owner. The dependent variable is BHAR-POST in regressions one to five and BHAR-POST in 
regressions six to eight. 
 
    BHAR-POST 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
BHAR-PRE 
(2) 
(3) 
  (1) (2) 3 (4) (5) (6) 7 (8) 
InsiderOwner  -0.338** -0.335** -0.329** -0.348** -0.346** 0.891** 0.905** 0.975** 
  (0.142) (0.142) (0.149) (0.152) (0.144) (0.440) (0.411) (0.407) 
Civil   0.035 0.002 0.031 -0.006 -0.02 -0.197 -0.19 -0.103 
  (0.161) (0.164) (0.169) (0.177) (0.172) (0.437) (0.435) (0.439) 
Antidirectors  0.017 -0.002 -0.008 -0.012 -0.004 0.19 0.189 0.242* 
  (0.036) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.138) (0.136) (0.140) 
StockMarket  -0.093** -0.104*** -0.098** -0.100** -0.106*** -0.259 -0.262 -0.241 
  (0.038) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.199) (0.198) (0.200) 
NYSE  0.24 0.26 0.285 0.281 0.256 -0.456 -0.408 -0.4 
  (0.187) (0.188) (0.193) (0.193) (0.189) (0.673) (0.676) (0.676) 
SizeDifferential  0.118 0.126* 0.153* 0.143* 0.122* 0.02 0.015 0.056 
  (0.072) (0.072) (0.081) (0.082) (0.073) (0.320) (0.318) (0.318) 
CapitalRaising  -0.056 -0.107 -0.079 -0.086 -0.112 0.329 0.301  
  (0.144) (0.153) (0.158) (0.159) (0.154) (0.408) (0.410)  
Dual-Class  -0.134 -0.124 -0.222 -0.237 -0.132  -0.416 -0.489 
  (0.177) (0.177) (0.184) (0.186) (0.179)  (0.558) (0.553) 
Global   0.163 0.106 0.133 0.177   -0.316 
   (0.164) (0.170) (0.174) (0.167)   (0.424) 
Turnover-POST    -0.006 -0.009     
    (0.029) (0.030)     
Coverage-POST     0.016 0.009    
     (0.022) (0.021)    
InsideOwnerDual       -0.301   
       (0.675)   
N  150 150 139 139 150 67 67 67 
R2  0.154 0.16 0.168 0.171 0.161 0.188 0.192 0.193 
F  3.241 2.99 2.606 2.408 2.696 1.703 1.758 1.760 
Adj-R2   0.107 0.107 0.104 0.100 0.102 0.077 0.083 0.083 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.  
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Table 11 
Seemingly unrelated regressions 
1
BHAR
k
j
i j i i
j
x v 

    
Dependent Variable: BHAR-POST & BHAR-PRE. Before and After SOX. Civil indicates the legal origin Civil or 
common law. Antidirectors equal the Antidirectors rights index. StockMarket is the Domestic Stock market 
development. InsiderOwner indicates that the firm has an insider-owner or group of insider-owners with at least 10% 
claim in the company. Ownership Concentration indicates that there is at least one investor, insider or outsider, which 
owns at least 10% of the firm. Dual-class equals to one if the firm uses more than one class of stock and with different 
voting rights. CapitalRaising indicates that the cross-listing is level 3. SOX equals one during and after the approval 
of SOX (2002). NYSE is a dummy variable if the firm’s host stock exchange is the NYSE.  Cross-Listed is a dummy 
variable equals to one in the cross-listing year and thereafter. InsiderCrossListed is the result of interaction Cross-
Listed*InsiderOwner. Owner*Dual-Class is the interaction Ownership Concentration*Dual-class. InsideOwnerDual 
is the interaction Dual-Class * Insider Owner. SizeDifferential is the difference in log assets with the matching firm. 
Coverage-POST is the median number of analyst following a firm during the three years after cross-listing. Turnover-
POST (Turnover-PRE) measures the turnover during the three-year post- (pre-) cross-listing period. The dependent 
variables are BHAR-POST in columns one to four and BHAR-PRE in columns five to eight. 
   BHAR-POST 
(2) 
(2) 
BHAR-PRE  
(2) 
(2) 
  Before After Before After Before After Before After 
InsiderOwner  -0.269** -0.176 -0.348** -0.135 0.937** 0.157 0.960*** 0.567 
  (0.125) (0.224) (0.139) (0.200) (0.401) (0.489) (0.360) (0.571) 
Civil  0.364 0.049 -0.051 0.278 -0.498 0.393 -0.454 -0.187 
  (0.232) (0.357) (0.174) (0.230) (0.585) (1.180) (0.529) (1.220) 
Antidirectors  0.177*** -0.091   0.288 0.644* 0.31 0.484 
  (0.063) (0.099)   (0.189) (0.337) (0.192) (0.352) 
StockMarket  -0.063 -0.102* -0.150** -0.070** -0.555* 1.352*** -0.569* 0.925* 
  (0.058) (0.053) (0.059) (0.033) (0.321) (0.443) (0.302) (0.514) 
NYSE  0.361** 0.341** 0.356** 0.333* -0.952 5.013*** -0.855 4.055** 
  (0.153) (0.170) (0.148) (0.188) (1.135) (1.331) (1.099) (1.826) 
SizeDifferential  0.087 0.282*** 0.117* 0.285*** 0.021 -0.041 -0.134 0.070 
  (0.058) (0.075) (0.065) (0.069) (0.411) (0.250) (0.417) (0.182) 
Dual-Class  -0.007 -0.232 -0.155 -0.179   -0.824** 0.577 
  (0.172) (0.179) (0.166) (0.176)   (0.365) (0.854) 
Turnover-POST    -0.01 0.011     
    (0.009) (0.119)     
Coverage-POST    0.016 -0.007     
        (0.022) (0.032)     
InsideOwnerDual      -0.555 1.900   
      (0.495) (1.369)   
N  148  138  66  66  
Firm Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Chi 2  13.35  6.91  25.76  10.65  
Significantly Different?  *  -  ***  -  
Cluster  148  138  66  66  
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.  
